Russian Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: Greater compliance or resilient self-confidence? CEPS Policy Brief No. 192, 1 July 2009 by Secrieru, Stanislav.
 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs, with the aim of 
interjecting the views of CEPS researchers and associates into the policy-making process in a timely fashion. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which he is associated. 
Stanislav Secrieru is Associate Researcher at the Center for East-European and Asian Studies in Bucharest and Fellow at 
the Institute for European Politics (Berlin) within the Study Programme on European Security. The author would like to 
thank Michael Emerson, Elena Gnedina, Octavian Milevschi, Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and the anonymous reviewer for 
helpful comments on previous drafts. The author is also grateful to Julie Dixon for stylistic improvements to the text. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) y © CEPS 2009 
Russian Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: 
Greater compliance or resilient self-confidence? 
Stanislav Secrieru 
 
Abstract 
The economic crisis has hit Russia hard and it seems 
that no sector or policy of the Russian state will 
remain unaffected. Several questions accordingly 
arise in regard to Russia’s foreign policy at this time 
of economic difficulties. Will the country fall victim 
to the crisis or will the crisis re-energise its 
assertiveness? Will Russia mechanically adjust to 
the declining curve of the oil price or will it preserve 
its self-assertive tone while the economic crisis fuels 
the aggressive rhetoric? Will the shortage of 
resources scale down Russia’s foreign policy 
ambitions? Among Russia’s possible responses are 
two alternative scenarios. The first portrays a more 
compliant Russia seeking to bridge the divide with 
the West. The second one is more or less static, and 
predicts no dramatic changes as long as Russia 
manages to preserve its political autonomy in the 
international arena, which is fundamental for 
upholding the Kremlin’s normative vision. 
Russian foreign policy and the 
economic crisis 
After months of pretending that the economic 
turmoil is not likely to affect Russia, the 
government went public on the multiple 
ramifications of the crisis. As a consequence, the 
authorities reintroduced into the Russian political 
discourse almost forgotten concepts such as deficit, 
budget cuts and unemployment. Since it seems that 
no sector or policy of the Russian state will escape 
unscathed, several questions arise in regard to 
Russia’s foreign policy at a time of economic 
difficulties. Will it fall victim to the crisis or will the 
crisis re-energise Russia’s assertiveness? Will it 
mechanically adjust to the declining curve of the oil 
price or will it preserve its self-assertive tone while 
the economic crisis fuels the aggressive rhetoric? 
Will the shortage of resources scale down Russia’s 
foreign policy ambitions? How will the crisis 
influence Russian foreign initiatives such as 
Medvedev’s European Security Treaty? 
Three years of crisis 
The economic crisis affecting Russia is not only a 
temporary embarrassment for one of the rising stars 
of the so-called ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) constellation, but also an unpleasant reality 
the Russian polity must learn to live with for some 
time to come. This is the conclusion the Russian 
authorities have reached after six months of 
economic turmoil. First, Minister of Finance Aleksei 
Kudrin admitted that Russia might need three years 
to emerge from the crisis.
1 Concomitantly, in an 
interview for the Russian Channel One, President 
Medvedev displayed a similar long-term approach 
towards the economic turbulence. Though less clear 
about its duration, he warned against many 
uncertainties on the road to recovery from the crisis 
and pleaded for mobilisation of the regional and 
local bureaucracy in tackling the multiple effects of 
                                                      
1 “Russia Might Not Emerge from Crisis for at Least 
Three Years”, 11 March 2009 (http://www.cdi.org/russia/ 
johnson/2009-50-23.cfm). 
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the crisis.
2 This public message marked a clear 
break from the position assumed at the start of the 
crisis. It ended a six-month discourse which evolved 
from vehement negation and attempts to control the 
information flow on the issue to a frank acceptance 
of the deep implications of the crisis and forecasting 
endeavours. 
Throughout the last decade, Russia pursued a 
strategy of integration in the world economy on its 
own terms. This presupposed the development of a 
wide web of trade links and privileged economic 
partnerships, without ceding an inch of sovereignty 
and at the same time retaining space for manoeuvre 
on the international stage.
3 Russia’s energy industry 
assumed a leading role in this scheme, a trend 
particularly visible in relations with the EU and the 
post-Soviet world. Apparently, the ‘sovereign 
integration’ brought generous dividends and 
convinced Moscow that it is on the right path 
towards a full but distinctive and respectful 
membership in international economic society. 
However, the crisis seems to challenge this 
assumption and questions the long-term 
sustainability of this strategy. Russia has 
rediscovered the diktat of the world markets and the 
deep interconnectedness which limits propensity for 
unrestrained autonomy. As confirmation, the 
Russian stock exchange fell synchronically with the 
oil bubble burst and convulsions in the US financial 
sector. Since mid-March, it began to recover once 
stocks in the US turned green and the oil price 
followed an ascending curve from below $40 up to 
$70 per barrel.  
After months of economic troubles nobody in 
Moscow denies that the crisis and its repercussions 
set the governmental agenda. The most dramatic 
drop in industrial output since 1998 (17.1% in May) 
together with high unemployment (9.9% in May) 
have inevitably led to changes in social attitudes 
towards the government and fuelled the potential for 
social unrest.
4 While the crisis unfolds, it 
                                                      
2 Conversation between Dmitry Medvedev and Director 
of News Programmes at Channel One Kirill Kleimenov, 
15 March 2009 (http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/ 
2009/03/15/1300_type82916_213985.shtml). 
3 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian 
Foreign Policy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 57-61. 
4 On June 2
nd residents of the small town of Pikalevo 
(near St. Petersburg) blocked a federal highway. The 
protest against deteriorating living conditions prompted 
Prime Minister Putin’s intervention, which ultimately 
brought the crisis to the end. There are between 400 and 
500 ‘mono-towns’ in Russia whose economic and social 
survival depends on one or two factories’ performance. 
Facing similar problems, the populations of these cities 
could follow the example set by the residents of Pikalevo 
in order to get the central authorities’ attention. 
jeopardises the most valuable accomplishment of 
the Kremlin, the new social contract
5 between the 
state and society in which citizens accept limitations 
on their political rights and liberties in exchange for 
growing economic prosperity. If the authorities do 
not deliver on their part of the contract, the 
population might recover a taste for protests 
challenging the fundamentals of ‘sovereign 
democracy’. The breach of the social contract might 
dispel the myth of the prime minister as ‘efficient 
manager’ and could breed dissension within the 
double-headed power vertikal.  
To neutralise the perils that the crisis has ushered in 
for the political order, conservative thinkers advise 
the leadership to inject more trust in the ‘sovereign 
democracy’ model. They plead for a renewed top-
bottom effort to improve the efficiency of 
democratic institutions, intensify dialogue with 
supporters of the regime and address the interests of 
the significant groups in society.
6 The message has 
been heard in the Kremlin. At a meeting with civil 
rights activists on April 15
th, President Medvedev 
acknowledged that Russia would not be able to 
survive the economic crisis without a confident and 
trustworthy relationship between the authorities and 
civil society.
7 In response to criticisms of the tough 
legislation restricting the activities of non-
governmental organisations, the President submitted 
to the State Duma amendments aimed to ease some 
restrictions imposed by his predecessor. 
It is not only the authorities, the real economy and 
the population that are feeling the heat of the 
economic crisis. Many of Russia’s prestige projects 
aiming at promoting the new image of a self-
confident country on the international scene are 
under strain. Gazprom has reduced sponsorship of 
FC Zenit, the jewel in the Russian football league's 
crown and last year’s UEFA cup winner. The 
funding cut is likely to influence the club’s transfer 
policy and very probably its future performance. In 
addition to grave mismanagement, two federal 
mega-construction sites, Sochi and Vladivostok, are 
experiencing financial shortages and looming 
budget cuts. In order to complete the winter 
Olympic Games venues by 2014, some officials 
                                                      
5 President Putin called for a new “social contract” in his 
first major speech. See Putin, Address to the Federal 
Assembly, 8 July 2000. 
6 See Iosif Diskin, Krizis i Demokratya. Konservativyi 
Vzglyad, 3 March 2009 (http://www.liberty.ru/Themes/ 
Iosif-Diskin-Krizis-i-demokratiya.-Konservativnyj-
vzglyad). 
7  Nachialo Zasedanya Soveta po Sodeistviu Razvitiu 
Institutuov Grazhdanskogo Obshestva i Pravam 
Tcheloveka, 15 April 2009 (http://www.kremlin.ru/text/ 
appears/2009/04/215116.shtml). Russian Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis| 3 
have suggested that students – a cheap labour force 
– could give a hand to organisers.
8 “Molodaya 
Gvardya”, a youth wing of “Edinaya Rossya”, has 
pledged to mobilise 12,000 young workers for 
Russia’s most important construction projects.
9 
Despite the prime minister’s reassurances that 
construction sites for the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Summit 2012 will continue to operate, 
the event could be moved from Vladivostok to 
Russia’s window into Europe, St Petersburg 
(Strelnya).
10 The Russian government seeks a 15% 
reduction in the budget for each event. 
In the aftermath of the military campaign in 
Georgia, the Kremlin rightly concluded that the 
Russian armed forces need additional financial 
resources for new hardware procurement. The recent 
inspection of Russian air forces revealed that 
approximately 90 of the 200 MIG-29 jets are out of 
action. There are another 100 jets to be inspected, 
but regardless of whatever statistics are made 
public, it is certain that any improvement in 
performance could be achieved only by an increase 
in allocated resources and by tight spending control.   
However, the crisis forced the executive to reduce 
the defence budget by 10%. In turn, high-ranking 
officers put on a brave face in an attempt to 
convince the public that the army has enough 
resources to continue its military modernisation. In 
the end, President Medvedev conceded during the 
meeting with high-ranking officers that a massive 
re-equipment of the armed forces will start no 
earlier than 2011.
11 For the time being, the Russian 
army will only be able to rely on a 10% proportion 
of modern equipment.
12 Since the planned 
modernisation of armed forces will be based 
overwhelmingly on home-made military hardware, 
the government’s immediate concern will be to 
rescue Russia’s defence industry, which faces 
                                                      
8 “Mutko Predlagaet Napraviti v Sochi Studencheskie 
Stroiotryady”,  Interfax, 19 February 2009 
(http://news.ng.ru/2009/02/19/1235048286.html).  
9 See, “Molodaya Gvardya” Gotova Poslati Molodezh na 
Krupneishii Stroiki, RIA Novosti, 13 April 2009 
(http://www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/index.shtml?2009/04/
13/757715). 
10 Grigori Sanin, “Ostrov Nevezenya”, Itoghi, No. 11, 9 
March 2009 
(http://www.itogi.ru/chto/2009/11/138157.html). 
11 Dmitri Medvedev, Speech at an Extended Session of 
the Defence Ministry Board, 17 March 2009 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/03/17/2037_t
ype82913type84779_214073.shtml). 
12 Anatoli Serdyukov, Doklad na Rasshirenom Zasedanii 
Kolleghii Ministerstva Oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 17 
March 2009 (http://www.mil.ru/info/1069/details/ 
index.shtml?id=60046). 
financial drain, a plunge in the demand for products 
with civil destination and a decline in external and 
possibly internal orders.
13 
The economic crisis influences Kremlin’s security 
calculations regarding the North Caucasus region. In 
1999, Prime Minister Putin launched the most 
violent operation in post-Soviet Russian history 
aimed at reintegrating the Chechen republic into the 
economic and legal space of the Russian Federation. 
After 10 years of heavy presence, Moscow plans to 
withdraw 20,000 troops from Chechnya, leaving 
behind three brigades (from the Interior Ministry 
and Ministry of Defence) and Spetznaz units. 
Besides the improved security situation in the 
republic, the Speaker of the Russian lower house 
Boris Gryzlov explained that heavy military 
presence requires substantial financial resources, 
which are difficult to provide at a time of economic 
difficulties.
14  
The economic crisis has weakened Russia. What 
kind of impact, if any, will it have on Russian 
foreign policy? There are two dominant images of 
Russian external behaviour during the economic 
turbulence. The first one portrays a more compliant 
Russia seeking to bridge the divide with the West. 
The second one is more or less static, and predicts 
no dramatic changes as long as Russia manages to 
preserve the political autonomy in the international 
arena that is fundamental for upholding the 
Kremlin’s normative vision.  
The crisis as a constraint 
Rationalists argue that power capabilities define the 
actors’ foreign policy goals. Accordingly, they 
assume that a decline in state resources will compel 
Russia to scale down its international ambitions. 
There are expectations that, as the crisis strikes with 
full force, Russian foreign policy will soften and 
Moscow will adopt a more conciliatory tone. Thus, 
the crisis is seen as an opportunity “for a new 
beginning”
15 in relations with the West. It is 
considered that it would be wise for the US and EU 
to take several concrete steps to meet Russia’s 
regional and global concerns. Such an approach 
would neutralise the Kremlin’s suspicion that the 
                                                      
13 For more on Russia’s defence sector problems, see 
Konstantin Makienko, Economic Crisis and Russia’s 
Defense Industry, Moscow Defense Brief, No. 1, 2009 
(http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2009/item2/article1/). 
14 “Vopros o Zavershenii v Cechine 
Kontraterroresticeskoi Operatsii ‘Nazrel”, Itar-Tass, 26 
March 2009 (http://www.itar-tass.com/level2.html? 
NewsID=13721570&PageNum=10). 
15 Dimitri K. Simes, “Russian Roulette”, The National 
Interest, 30 October 2008 
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West is likely to speculate on the vulnerabilities of a 
weakened Russia and extract more advantages. 
Alleviating these fears might help to find the right 
balance between the “three branches of European 
civilisation”
16 – Russia, the EU and North America.  
On the Russian side, the desire to overcome the all-
time low in relations with the West could be a 
favourable factor. Nevertheless, such adjustments 
will take place not as the natural consequence of a 
gradual convergence of values, but as the result of 
long-term calculations driven by Russia’s economic 
vulnerabilities and security imperatives.  
Firstly, the crisis will sharpen the structural 
problems of the Russian economy and make 
diversification a vital task. Moscow is fully aware 
that energy resources alone cannot generate a new 
cycle of sustainable growth. Secondly, the Russian 
corporate sector has a $500 billion debt, part of 
which might have to be restructured. Because of the 
heavy state presence in the economy, the debt is a 
quasi-governmental burden. This issue was raised 
with Minister Kudrin during the G7 finance 
ministers’ summit in Rome in February 2009. 
Thirdly, if internal resources (the Reserve Fund, the 
National Wealth Fund and international reserves) 
shrink faster than anticipated and the crisis deepens, 
the government will need massive international 
loans to finance its budget deficits in the years to 
come. The profits made by Gazprom – the main 
contributor to the federal budget – are expected to 
drop in 2009 by $29 billion. Finally, Russia will 
face serious security threats if the new US strategy 
fails in Afghanistan
17 and some allies decide to 
withdraw by 2010-11.  
In order, therefore, to address the multiple internal 
problems effectively and prevent negative spill-over 
effects from Afghanistan on its soft underbelly, 
Russia could seek to mend relations with the West 
and develop sustainable interactions with its 
financial and security institutions. Rationalists argue 
that, despite the post-8/8/08
18 inertia, there are 
already discernible signs of policy reorientation. 
In this context, the sober and conciliatory tone used 
by Russian officials behind the scenes during 
private exchanges and the genuine desire to re-
                                                      
16 Dmitri Medvedev, Speech at Meeting with German 
Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, 5 June 2008 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_t
ype82912type82914type84779_202153.shtml). 
17 “What if…” debate is already underway in Russia. See, 
for instance, Ilya Kramnik, “Afganistan: Pohod Zapada 
po Sovetskim Grablyam”, RIA-Novosti, 15 February 2009 
(http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20090215/162051686.html) 
18 Russian officials regard the war in Georgia (08/08/08) 
as similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
establish relations on the cooperative agenda could 
serve as proof of the Kremlin’s willingness to make 
foreign policy adjustments. Moreover, Russian 
readiness to engage with NATO and reverse the 
decision on the deployment of the SS-26 short-range 
ballistic missile system (Iskander) in Kaliningrad 
might also be interpreted as further evidence of 
Russia’s evolving new international stance.  
Viewed from this perspective, the Kremlin’s 
gestures towards the Obama administration could 
indicate that Russia sees a way to reconnect to the 
West via Washington. This explains the approval of 
the transit through Russia of US non-lethal military 
supplies for troops in Afghanistan, intensified 
contacts and dialogue at expert level on the new 
strategic arms control treaty (START-I, due to 
expire in December 2009), delay of the political 
decision on deliveries of S-300 long-range surface-
to-air missile systems to Iran, almost identical with 
the US position on North Korea’s intercontinental 
ballistic missile test plans, and promising bilateral 
meetings at the highest diplomatic level. Neither 
finance minister Kudrin’s remarks on the causal 
relation between the US economic recovery and 
Russia’s emergence from the crisis
19 nor President 
Medvedev’s agreement on the need to “reboot” the 
relationship at the Russian-American Public 
Dialogue Group
20 have been overlooked.  
Rationalists argue that, while Russian foreign policy 
reorientation is still at an embryonic stage, the West 
has to seize the moment and reciprocate quickly by 
engaging Russia. Talks on the European Security 
Treaty and more sensitivity towards Russia’s 
interest in post-Soviet space would be a good 
starting point. A move of this kind could guarantee 
Russian support on issues like Iran, Afghanistan and 
nuclear non-proliferation, and would have an overall 
beneficial impact on an improved Atlantic order. If 
it is not careful, however, the West could find itself 
on the wrong path to engaging Russia. A hasty and 
ill-conceived Western response to the one-
dimensional European Security Treaty proposal 
(focused on hard security) will play into Russian 
hands. More understanding for Moscow’s interest in 
the ‘near abroad’ will only encourage Russia’s 
assertiveness in the region. Finally, Russia’s 
leverage and its ability to discourage Iran from 
acquiring nuclear capability are often overrated.
21 
                                                      
19 “Rossya Vyidet iz Krizisa po Sledam SShA”, 2 March 
2009 (http://www.svpressa.ru/issue/news.php?id=5176). 
20 Beginning of Meeting with Members of the Russian-
American Public Dialogue Group, Russia-USA: A Look 
into the Future, 20 March 2009 (http://www.kremlin.ru/ 
eng/speeches/2009/03/20/2042_type82914_214187.shtml) 
21 For more detailed analysis, see Stephen Sestanovich, 
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The crisis has set the premises for Kremlin 
rapprochement with the West by increasing 
opportunities for cooperation, but this is only one of 
several possible ways in which Russia could react. 
There are other potential outcomes. Thus, it would 
be premature to interpret the above-mentioned 
conciliatory actions as signs of a long-term trend. 
On the deterministic assumption that every actor 
will react alike to the pressure of diminishing 
resources, many rationalists overlook the role of 
ideas in foreign policy. This leaves a question mark 
over a significant number of other Russian foreign 
policy decisions taken during the crisis. While 
correctly depicting the constraining nature of the 
crisis, those rationalists who neglect actors’ ideas
22 
fail to foresee alternative reactions by Russia 
beyond those prescribed. In order to anticipate 
reactions, we have to examine closely the last 
decade’s mutations in Russia’s international self-
perception and understand the factors that sustain its 
self-confidence. 
The crisis as an opportunity and test 
The most explicit expression of the prevailing mood 
in Moscow is illustrated by Sergei Lavrov’s speech 
at MGIMO. Outlining the vision of a proactive 
Russia, the foreign minister announced the end of 
the “concentration phase” defined by the 
Gorchakovian statement that “Russia is not 
retreating, Russia is concentrating”. Instead, the 
head of Russian diplomacy  made a plea for the 
channelling of accumulated resources in order to set 
and implement Moscow’s international agenda.
23 
The discourse confirms the consensus reached by 
the elites at the end of Putin's presidency. The idea 
that Russia has recovered its role as great power and 
is an independent centre in a multipolar world is an 
important image that shapes Russian self-
                                                                                      
Relations”,  Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, 
November/December 2008 
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64603/stephen-
sestanovich/what-has-moscow-done). 
22 For a good account of the role of ideas in foreign 
policy as perceived by rationalists, see Judith Goldstein 
and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy. 
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca, NY 
and London: Cornel University Press, 1993.  
23 Sergei Lavrov, Vystuplenie v MGIMO(U) MID Rossii, 
1 September 2008 (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/ 
2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/dc8247ee1acb0d9
5c32574b70038a1a5?OpeDocument). The “concentration 
philosophy” has guided the policy of Yevgheni 
Primakov, Igor Ivanov and until recently Sergei Lavrov. 
Seen in this perspective, minister Lavrov’s declaration 
highlights a turning point in Russian foreign policy.  
perception.
24 Another important element around 
which consensus has crystallised is the need to 
switch from reactive to proactive foreign policy. 
Russia wants to shape the international 
environment, not just to react to its constraints. This 
is the rationale behind Medvedev’s initiative on the 
European Security Treaty. These sentiments are 
deeply entrenched in the psyche of Russia’s political 
class. Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that the crisis 
will instantly wipe out the self-confidence and 
tendency to self-assertiveness cultivated and 
internalised by Russia’s ruling elites during the oil 
boom. 
In contrast to the turbulent 1990s, Russia has 
entered the crisis with the perception that it is 
prepared to withstand it and able to continue to 
pursue foreign policy projects forcefully. There are 
two fundamental factors that strengthen Moscow’s 
stance. Firstly, Russia is not the only power that has 
been affected. The US is omnipresent in Russia’s 
economic crisis calculations. Moscow considers that 
the US financial and economic difficulties could 
result in an increased propensity for multilateralism, 
understood in the Kremlin as an inclination to reach 
agreements on strategic dossiers within a great 
power framework. Secondly, Russia has a financial 
safety net. Despite the multiple ramifications of the 
crisis, the Russian leadership thinks that 
international reserves ($409.5 billion) and 
stabilisation funds (the Reserve Fund – $121 billion, 
the National Wealth Fund – $85.7 billion) provide 
enough resources to overcome the economic 
turbulence and preserve its space for manoeuvre. 
The corporate debt problem looks less critical from 
Moscow’s perspective. The government has stated 
that during recent months the Russian corporate 
sector managed to repay or restructure $174 billion 
worth of debt.
25 
Moscow believes that Russia’s place in the global 
power structure depends on how it will emerge 
internally and externally from the crisis. Any 
reversal could be interpreted as a sign of weakness 
and, as the Russian prime minister once stated, “the 
                                                      
24 For more on Russian identity mutations and foreign 
policy implications, see Valentina Feklyunina, “Battle for 
Perceptions: Projecting Russia in the West”, Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 60, No. 4, June 2008, pp. 605-629; Alfred 
B. Evans, Jr., “Putin’s Legacy and Russia’s Identity”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 6, August 2008, pp. 
899-912; Jakub M. Godzimirski, “Putin and Post-Soviet 
Identity: Building Block and Buzz Words”, Problems of 
Post-Communism, Vol. 55, No. 5, September/October 
2008, pp. 14-27. 
25 Otchet V.V. Putina v Gosudarstennoi Dume, 6 April 
2009 
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weak get beaten”.
26 Therefore, Russia is likely to 
maintain its current course aimed at securing “a 
place in the front row of international relations”.
27 
The head of the government has stated 
unequivocally that Russia has to “emerge from the 
crisis stronger and more competitive”.
28  
Nonetheless, Russia’s determination to resist the 
economic constraints of the crisis does not mean 
that Moscow is slow in adapting. Russia intends to 
minimise the effects of the economic turmoil by an 
ambitious anti-crisis package estimated to total 
9.1% of the GDP in 2009. The partial recovery of 
oil prices might not be enough for a new economic 
boom, but it could provide for a stronger bargaining 
position in the international arena. It might also help 
to avoid massive borrowing on the international 
market (as additional profits will be channelled to 
the Reserve Fund), which would otherwise constrain 
Russia’s autonomy. Thus, there are reasons to 
expect closer policy coordination between Russia 
and OPEC. Moscow is convinced that the problem 
of corporate debts and investments has solutions not 
only in the West but also in the East. In February, 
Russia’s Rosneft and Transneft secured a 20-year 
credit of $25 billion from the China Development 
Bank. Rosneft will refinance debts and support an 
investments programme, while Transneft will direct 
resources for the construction of the Eastern Siberia-
Pacific Ocean pipeline spur to China, due to start in 
mid 2009.  
Russia expects to make maximum profit from some 
openings that spring from the crisis. Faced with 
multiple internal problems, Russia perceives the 
crisis as a geopolitical opportunity to oust the EU 
and the US from the post-Soviet world and 
strengthen its own position in the region.
29 Nor has 
the crisis reduced its appetite to reap some juicy 
assets in the West. Equally strong is Russia’s zeal to 
reshuffle the security architecture in Europe and to 
have more weight in international institutions. 
While the post-Soviet states will be the primary 
political-economic targets, the global agenda will 
figure high in the Kremlin’s corridors of power.  
                                                      
26 Address by President Vladimir Putin after the hostage 
crisis in Beslan, 4 September 2004 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/09/04/1958_t
ype82912_76332.shtml). 
27 Dmitry Rogozin, “We Deserve a Front-Row Seat”, 
Moscow Times, 31 March 2009 
(http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/375806.htm) 
28 Vladimir Putin, Vystuplenie na Otkrytie X Siezda 
Partii “Edinaya Rossya”, 20 November 2008 
(http://premier.gov.ru/events/1212.html). 
29 See Aleksei Malashenko, “Krizis i SNG: Shans Dojiti 
do Rassveta”, RIA-Novosti, 3 March 2009 
(http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20090310/164340576.html) 
In January the Minister of Economic Development, 
Elvira Nabibulina, called for the creation of a 
special body that would coordinate public and 
private efforts to acquire cheap assets in the CIS.
30 
Even before arranging this structure, Russian state 
as well as private companies had already signed a 
number of lucrative deals. Russian 
Vnesheconombank bought a 75% stake in Kiev’s 
Prominvestbank, the sixth largest bank in Ukraine, 
while the Russian top gold company (owned by 
Mikhail Prokhorov), Poluys Gold, reached an 
agreement on a 50.1% share of Kazakh Gold. In line 
with previous agreements, Russia increased its stake 
in Beltransgaz to 37.5%, planning to raise it shortly 
to 50%. Gazprom has closed the deal with Itera, 
raising for $49.3 million its stake in Armenia’s 
Armrosgazprom from 75% to 80%. Moscow has 
written off the Kyrgyz government’s $180 million 
debt in exchange for 48% in equipment and naval 
torpedoes manufacturer Dastan.  
The Russian gas monopoly intends to expand in 
Moldova’s energy sector by acquiring power plants 
CET-1 and CET-2 in Chisinau, and CET-Nord 
Balti, while the Russian Sberbank expressed its 
interest in rescuing the troubled Kazakh BTA Bank 
with branches in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. Despite the recent ‘milk 
war’ between Russia and Belarus, Moscow still 
hopes to participate in the privatisation of the 
Belarus dairy industry. Moreover, Russia is 
attempting further penetration of the Belarus energy 
sector in order to acquire a stake in Mozyri Oil 
refinery. 
Russia has been equally proactive in the West. 
Vnesheconombank took over Malev, the Hungarian 
airline. Russia’s leading mining and metals 
company Mechel reached the $425 million deal on 
Bluestone Coal Corporation and state-owned 
Sberbank bought a 35% stake in Opel. Sberbank has 
plans for more acquisitions in Europe; the 
Hungarian OTP bank is among possible targets.  
On the ‘energy front’, Gazprom has concluded the 
agreement with Hungary’s Development Bank on 
the South Stream project and has confirmed interest 
in Slovenia’s fuel retailer Petrol, while 
Surgutneftegaz has purchased 21.2% of Hungarian 
MOL for €1.4 billion. Kremlin-friendly Lukoil has 
bought 49% of ERG’s Isab refinery in Priolo in 
Sicily (€1.35 billion) and a 45% stake in Dutch TRN 
oil-refinery ($725 million). Lukoil is set to continue 
the expansion. Russian company made an offer for a 
30% shares package (estimated at €9.8 billion) in 
Spain’s energy company Repsol, expressed the 
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Rossiiskih Investitsiiv SNG”, 27 January 2009 
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intention to bid for a stake in the Czech Republic’s 
largest oil refinery Ceska Rafinerska and allegedly, 
with Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline monopoly 
Transneft has approached Polish PKN Orlen to 
acquire part of Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta. After 
the Sakhalin-2 LNG plant launch, Gazprom has 
announced its interest in Japan’s gas distribution 
network. Thus, although the crisis has dealt a heavy 
blow to the Russian national champions, they intend 
to make maximum profit from the global discount, 
in some cases with the help of the state.
31 
Russia’s ‘shopping season’ was accompanied by a 
massive infusion of credits or financial aid to 
Armenia ($500 million), Belarus ($2 billion), 
Kyrgyzstan (a $2 billion loan and aid worth $150 
million), Moldova ($500 million promised) the 
separatist enclaves Abkhazia ($68 million) and 
South Ossetia ($81 million dollars in addition to the 
$246 million assigned for post-war reconstruction of 
infrastructure) and the EurAsEc special fund (out of 
$10 billion, Russia contributes $7.5 billion). 
Another post-Soviet separatist enclave – 
Transnistria – is in line for Moscow’s $200 million 
financial rescue package.32 Moscow has been 
discussing with officials in Kiev the terms of the $5 
billion credit required to keep Ukraine’s economy 
afloat. However, after the high-level Investment 
Conference on modernisation of Ukraine’s gas 
transit system in Brussels, Russia has shelved the 
deal.  
The Kremlin has sent signals that the claims of 
privileged interests are credible and must be taken 
very seriously. For this reason, Russia made a loan 
agreement with Kyrgyzstan coinciding with the 
latter’s decision to demand the evacuation of the US 
military base from Manas, and promoted the 
initiative for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force 
within the CSTO, which is supposed to have “the 
same sort of training as the troops of the North 
Atlantic Alliance”.33 Russia, not surprisingly, 
                                                      
31 Lukoil secured €1 billion from Gazprombank. 
Previously, the company asked between $2 and $5 billion 
of state aid. 
32 Data on Russia’s aid collected from Denis Malkov, 
Maria Tsvetkova and Natalya Kostenko, “Dorogya 
Druzhba”,  Vedomosti, 4 February 2009 
(http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2009/
02/04/180092); Interview with Igor Smirnov, 
“Nezavisimaya Gazeta”, 23 March 2009 
(http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-03-23/1_Pridnestrovie.html); 
“Rossya Vydelila 5 milliardov rublei Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi 
Ossetii”,  Grani.ru, 18 March 2009 
(http://www.grani.ru/Economy/m.148745.html). 
33 Press conference following CSTO and EurAsEC 
Summits, 4 February 2009 (http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/ 
speeches/2009/02/04/1956_type82914type82915_212504
.shtml). 
reacted to the EU initiative to upgrade relations with 
six post-Soviet states. Minister Lavrov qualified the 
Eastern Partnership as “an attempt to extend the 
EU’s sphere of influence”.34 In another move, the 
Kremlin re-energised its efforts to solve the frozen 
conflict. Under its auspices, Moscow organised a 
high-level trilateral Russia-Moldova-Transnistria 
meeting. Previously hosting a similar summit on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia is eager after the 
short summer war in Georgia to reassure the sides of 
its peace-broker intentions, make sure that it 
remains an indispensable actor for the resolution of 
the ‘frozen conflicts’ and sideline the West in 
negotiations. Last but not least, Moscow put 
additional pressure on Belarus to recognise 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.35 The underlying 
logic of these actions is that if the West plans 
something in the post-Soviet world, Moscow 
expects to be consulted. Otherwise the West will 
have to face the consequences and prepare to ‘be 
evacuated’.  
Although several Russian proposals formulated for 
the London G20 summit were refuted by the 
economists as unrealistic, the 8-page document36 
clearly demonstrates Moscow’s ambition to increase 
its clout in world economic structures. The ‘near 
abroad’ has not escaped from the Kremlin’s image-
making schemes. Moscow sought formal approval 
by CIS finance ministers and heads of National 
Banks of the proposals submitted. After obtaining 
consent, at the G20 summit Russia could assume, at 
least symbolically, the role of the regional leader 
representing the interests of the post-Soviet world at 
the highest level. 
Moscow has not reduced its diplomatic investments 
in high-profile international meetings, organising on 
June 16th in Yekaterinburg the first BRIC summit. 
The meeting had the role of coordinating the 
positions of ‘the rest’ in order to reshuffle or reform 
international financial institutions.  The Kremlin 
hopes to keep Russia in the international diplomacy 
circuit by hosting the conference on peace in the 
Middle East and the summit of the biggest oil 
producers. Russia remains equally proactive on the 
European Security Treaty proposal, which seeks to 
establish new security architecture in Europe based 
not on “the Cold War institutions, but [a deal] with 
                                                      
34 Quoted in Valentina Pop, “EU Expanding its ‘Sphere 
of Influence’, Russia says”, EUobserver, 21 March 2009 
(http://euobserver.com/9/27827). 
35 See, “Belarus Samostoyatelino Budet Reshati Vopros o 
Priznanii Abkhazii i Iuzhnoi Osetii”, 5 June, 2009 
(http://www.belta.by/ru/topics?tid=773&id=379687). 
36 Russian Proposals to the London Summit (April 2009), 
16 March 2009 (http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/ 
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Great Powers”.
37 Russia is striving for a new deal, 
similar to the European concert of powers. Moscow 
is aware of the risk of losing the initiative in the 
event of a security architecture reshuffle and is 
determined to push this issue actively with the 
European preferential partners. The crisis seems not 
to have affected Russia’s muscular policy. Moscow 
might not have enough money to renew its air force 
inventory, but it has enough fuel for the old one. In 
February 2009, the Canadian air force intercepted 
two Russian TU-95 strategic bombers close to its 
national airspace. The event provoked a harsh 
diplomatic exchange reminiscent of the Cold War 
era.   
Conclusions 
The resources Moscow has stored for the crisis 
bolster Russia’s self-confidence and therefore the 
ruling elite’s consensus on Russia’s place in the 
world affairs is set to survive the economic troubles 
in the medium term. On the other hand, a financial 
safety net may have perverse effects. An 
overconfident Russian leadership might not fully 
grasp the magnitude of the crisis and to overestimate 
Russia’s global weight. Such misjudgements could 
see Russia neglect the structural reforms needed for 
a new cycle of sustainable growth and would expose 
Moscow’s reduced ability to set the international or 
regional agenda. The early signs are already visible, 
particularly in the ‘near abroad’ where Kyrgyzstan 
reversed its decision to close the US military base, 
the Belarus-Uzbek duo opposed conclusion of the 
agreement on formation of the CSTO Rapid 
Reaction Force, while resource-rich Turkmenistan 
refrained from signing the deal with Russia on 
construction of the Caspian gas pipeline while 
multiplying efforts to deepen ties in the energy field 
with the West and China. Thus, if not adjusted 
accordingly, the Russian domestic and foreign 
policies risk amplifying the effects of the crisis with 
dire consequences in the long run. Instead of re-
assuring Russia’s normative vision, the crisis could 
widen the gap between ambitions and resources, 
pushing elites mentally back to frustrating late 
1990s. 
However, in the immediate perspective, there is no 
societal demand for radical change in foreign policy 
orientation. According to opinion polls, despite the 
economic crisis, 42% of those surveyed approve the 
government policy to assist allies financially, while 
40% consider such assistance an efficient 
                                                      
37 Round Table “Russia, NATO, and the Future of 
European Security” with Dmitri Rogozin, Chatham 
House, 20 February 2009 
(http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13622_200209ro
gozin.pdf). 
investment that will bring many benefits to Russia.
38 
If anything, an even more assertive foreign policy 
could be used to shore up domestic support for the 
authorities in case the crisis deepens. This will 
certainly inflate the rhetoric and weaken the 
foundations of sustainable relations with the West. 
Hopes, then, that a self-assertive foreign policy will 
fade away under the pressure of the crisis are short-
sighted and ignore the impact of the oil boom on the 
Russian strategic identity. Putin’s reply in Davos, 
“We are not handicapped people, we do not need to 
be helped”,
39 is indicative of Moscow’s self-
perception. The Western policy based on the 
assumption of declining resources and mechanical 
adjustments is risky and more likely to prove 
counterproductive. While the crisis might increase 
the tactical space for cooperation on the Russian 
side, the West should not harbour illusions about a 
submissive Russia.  
Though potentially useful, the intrinsic value of 
rebooting US-Russian relations should not be 
overestimated. Moscow is unlikely to change its 
perception of the West as an obstacle to Russia’s re-
assertion of its influence in the ‘near abroad’, which 
it considers to be an attractive space for its 
investments and containing useful players on several 
international security dossiers. Seen from this 
perspective, Russian foreign policy will display 
elements of intense competition in the post-Soviet 
region, a propensity for stealth and non-binding 
integration in the world economy (with the focus 
first of all on Europe), and selective cooperation on 
political-military issues with multi-vectoral partners. 
Under such circumstances the West has first to 
focus on building a new transatlantic consensus on 
the strategic issues. The polls on both shores of the 
Atlantic show that the population perceives the link 
as inefficient and the overwhelming majority of 
those surveyed expect governments to make 
necessary repairs.
40 A redefined transatlantic link is 
likely to produce better coordination of the US and 
EU policy on Russia.  
In the medium term, a recalibration of Western 
policy on Russia and related issues has to target the 
following tasks:  
                                                      
38 “U Rossyan Net Edinogo Mnenya po Povodu Vydachi 
Kreditov Drugim Stranam”, 24 February 2009 
(http://www.regnum.ru/news/1128649.html). 
39 “Putin urges Europe not to Fog His Mind”, 30 January 
2009 (http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/30-01-
2009/107035-putin_davos-0). 
40 “Nine-Country Poll Finds Europeans and Americans 
Desire Closer Relations”, 18 March 2008 
(http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/breurop
era/458.php?lb=breu&pnt=458&nid=&id). Russian Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis| 9 
•  to formulate a coherent and comprehensive 
answer to Russia’s proposal for the European 
Security Treaty and engage Russia in 
negotiations within the OSCE platform;  
•  to intensify dialogue and interaction with Russia 
along the ‘cooperation axis’,
41 where the 
positions of both sides converge or where there is 
at least basic consensus (Afghanistan, START 
negotiations, combating piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden);  
                                                      
41 Elena Gnedina, a visiting Research Fellow at CEPS, 
suggested this approach. 
•  to speed up elaboration of a coherent EU external 
energy policy that would guarantee 
sustainability, competitiveness and security of 
supply;
42 and  
•  to seriously boost the EU’s policy in its Eastern 
neighbourhood. A new political will is needed to 
give real effect to the Eastern Partnership 
initiative launched in May 2009, and in particular 
to help post-Soviet states to limit the effects of 
the economic crisis.  
                                                      
42 Objectives set out in Commission’s Green Paper: A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy,  2006 (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-
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